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Abstract 
We introduce the concept of “marketing avoidance” – consumer efforts to 
conceal themselves and to deflect marketing.  The setting is one where 
sellers market some item through solicitations to potential consumers, the 
potential consumers differ in their value for the item, and the potential 
consumers suffer harm from receiving solicitations.   
Seller marketing is a strategic complement with concealment by low-value 
consumers.  Hence, efforts by low-value consumers to conceal themselves 
will increase the cost-effectiveness of marketing and lead sellers to market 
more.  However, concealment by high-value consumers leads sellers to 
market less. 
Owing to the externality from sellers to consumers, there is a clear need 
for public policy.  A tax on solicitations should take account of both the 
expected harm to consumers and also the costs of consumer concealment 
and deflection induced by the seller solicitations. 
From a consumer’s viewpoint, concealment and deflection are substitutes: 
both reduce her likelihood of being solicited.  But only concealment affects 
the “effective pool” of consumers that sellers address.  Accordingly, from a 
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1. Introduction 
Privacy of personal information is a key concern for consumers:  
“There has been a well-documented transformation in consumer privacy 
attitudes over the past decade, moving concerns from a modest matter 
for a minority of consumers in the 1980s to an issue of high intensity 
expressed by more than three-fourth of American consumers in 2001” 
(Westin 2001). 
Consumers use video-recorders, TiVo, caller-ID, spam filters, pop-up 
blockers, anonymous browsing, and other devices and techniques to protect 
their privacy and avoid marketing.  In the U.S., over 50 million telephone 
numbers have been registered with the Federal Trade Commission “do not call” 
list (EPIC 2004).  Such consumer actions to avoid marketing present critical 
challenges to marketers: 
“What’s an advertiser to do when the most affluent customers aren't 
compelled to watch TV commercials and are, in fact, actively avoiding 
them?” (Barnes 2003). 
  Improvements in computing technologies are creating both new 
techniques of marketing and new ways to avoid marketing.  These present new 
challenges to the marketing profession and public policy makers.  How should 
marketers respond to consumer avoidance of marketing?  How do marketers 
and consumers interact, and how does technology affect their interaction?  What 
is the appropriate public policy towards marketing activities that impose harm 
on consumers?   
Generally, prior analytical research in marketing has ignored the impact of 
marketing on consumer privacy and assumed that consumers would passively 
accept advertising and direct marketing.  In this paper, we develop an analytical 
model that introduces the concept of “marketing avoidance” with which to 
address issues of marketing strategy and public policy.  We focus on the 
endogenous trade-off between seller marketing and consumer privacy: 
consumers can only get the item through seller’s marketing, but the marketing 
imposes costs on consumers and leads them to expend resources on avoidance.   2
The setting comprises multiple sellers who compete to market an 
identical product.  There are two consumer segments: one segment has a higher 
valuation for the product than the other segment.  Absent the sellers’ marketing, 
consumers cannot buy the item.  All consumers experience some harm from the 
sellers’ marketing.  A consumer may spend resources to avoid marketing in two 
ways – concealment or deflection.  At the point of time that they incur 
marketing expenditures, sellers cannot distinguish the two types of consumer.  
Further, sellers ignore the harm caused by their marketing. 
We show that seller marketing is a strategic complement with 
concealment by low-value consumers.  Efforts by low-value consumers to 
conceal themselves will increase the cost-effectiveness of marketing and lead 
sellers to market more.  However, concealment by high-value consumers leads 
sellers to market less. 
Next, owing to the externality from sellers to consumers, there is a clear 
need for public policy.  A tax on solicitations set equal to the expected harm 
caused to consumers would be insufficient.  The tax should also take account of 
the costs to consumers of concealment and deflection induced by the seller 
solicitations. 
Both concealment and deflection reduce a consumer’s likelihood of being 
solicited.  But only concealment shrinks the “effective pool” of consumers that 
sellers address, and so, further increases the expected harm.  Accordingly, from 
a social welfare perspective, deflection is preferable to concealment. 
The next section presents the background literature, and the following Section 3 
introduces the analytical setting.  Section 4 develops the consumer-seller 
equilibrium and Section 5 presents welfare and empirical implications.  Section 6 
concludes with limitations, extensions, and directions for future research. 
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2.  Background Literature 
A substantial literature in economics and marketing analyzes how sellers 
compete to acquire customers on dimensions of advertising and price (Butters 
1977; McAfee 1994; McGahan and Ghemawat 1994; Chen and Iyer 2002; Baye 
and Morgan 2001 and 2004; Iyer and Pazgal 2003; Chioveanu 2003).  Separately, 
analytical research into privacy has considered how marketers use personal 
information to effect price discrimination or screen out “bad” consumers (Chen 
et al. 2001; Chen and Iyer 2002; Taylor 2004; Acquisti and Varian 2005; Wathieu 
2002).
1 
However, for the most part, previous analytical research ignored the harm 
that marketing imposes on consumers.  Marketers use personal information to 
solicit new and existing customers, by direct mail, telephone, and fax, and 
electronically.  Marketers also promote goods and services through advertising 
in the mass media.  Advertising and unsolicited contacts impose inconvenience 
and other costs on consumers.
2  Marketers do not internalize these harms, and 
hence tend to over-spend on advertising and direct marketing relative to the 
socially optimal level (Petty 2000).   
Anderson and de Palma (2005) analyze a direct marketing setting where 
sellers incur costs to send messages about some item to consumers, and 
consumers incur costs to “open” the messages.  The item is available only 
through the sellers’ messages.  The sellers are heterogeneous and offer products 
of differing quality.  In this scenario, an increase in the sellers’ cost of 
communication can raise welfare by screening out lower-quality sellers.  The 
average product quality would rise and more consumers would open messages 
addressed to them.
3  
    By contrast with Anderson and de Palma (2005), we emphasize 
heterogeneity among consumers, and, the actions that consumers take to avoid 
                                            
1  For a survey of the economics of privacy, see Hui and Png (2006).  
2  The costs imposed may differ with the advertising medium (Milne and Rohm 2000). 
3  Gantman and Spiegel
  (2004) consider the trade-off in software that incorporates 
advertising banners (“adware”) between the benefit to consumers of receiving targeted 
information which improves their choice of product against the privacy cost.   4
advertising and solicitations, what we call “marketing avoidance”.  Motivated by 
the economics of security (Koo and Png 1994; Ayres and Levitt 1998), we 
distinguish two forms of marketing avoidance – concealment and deflection.  
This generalizes the concept of “ad avoidance”, already recognized in the 
literature (Speck and Elliott 1997).  In our framework, “ad avoidance” 
represents deflection. 
Our analysis considers the interests of heterogeneous consumers who 
differ in their value for some item that is only available through seller marketing.  
All consumers suffer harm from marketing.   We do not take an a priori position 
as to the merits of marketing, but rather, address the endogenous trade-off among 
the benefit of the item to consumers, the harm imposed on consumers by 





3.  Setting 
We are motivated by the retail marketing of real estate brokerage, mobile 
telephone service, insurance, magazine subscriptions, cosmetics, and designer 
clothing – where the focus of competition is acquiring customers rather than 
price.  In many markets, real estate brokerage commissions are fixed, hence 
brokers compete on service rather than price.  T-Mobile, Verizon, and Sprint are 
represented by multiple outlets and independent retailers, all of which offer the 
same service plans.  Likewise, in the insurance market, Prudential, State Farm, 
and AXA are represented by multiple agents and independent brokers who 
compete for customers in person and through telemarketing.  Time and 
Newsweek subscriptions are marketed through multiple integrated and 
independent channels such as magazine inserts, Publishers Clearing House, and 
the Internet.  Estee Lauder and Ralph Lauren are advertised by multiple 
department stores in the same city.
5 
                                            
4  See, also, Chellappa and Shivendu (2003). 
5  Of 50 solicitations received in a Singapore mailbox between June and August 2005, the 
largest number (eight) were sent by real-estate brokers, none of which quoted price.   On July   5
Accordingly, we assume that price,  p, is fixed for some item and then  N  
sellers compete through solicitations to market it.  The cost to seller m of 
sending  m S  solicitations is  ) ( m S C , where 














d .   (1) 
This sequence of actions is consistent with advertising and direct marketing 
solicitations that include the prices of the items.  For simplicity, we assume that 
the cost of producing the item is zero. 
Potential consumers can buy the item only if solicited, and in particular, 
they do not seek out sellers (Butters 1977; Grossman and Shapiro 1984; McAfee 
1994; Anderson and de Palma 2005).  They are of two types.  There are H  high 
types who derive benefit v from the item, and L low types who derive benefit 
v λ , where  1 < λ .  Both types suffer the same harm w from receiving a 
solicitation.
6  
Consumers can take action to conceal themselves from solicitations being 
addressed to them, for instance, by registering with the “no junk mail” list, 
subscribing to an unlisted telephone number, and using anonymous web 
browsing.  Given that a seller has sent a solicitation, let the probability that a 
particular consumer  j is addressed be  ) ( j k α , where  j k  represents the 
consumer’s effort in concealment and the function  ) ( j k α  is a probability, with 
α α α α α = > < =













    (2) 
                                                                                                                                     
23, 2005, six different Singapore retailers advertised the Nokia 6020 at S$128 in conjunction 
with Singapore Telecom or StarHub service plans.  On August 7, 2005, six different U.S. 
websites advertised one-year subscriptions as follows: Cosmopolitan (all six charged $18), 
Newsweek (five charged $31.97 and one, Amazon.com, charged $31.00), and Forbes (prices 
ranging from $29.95 to $29.99).  During August 2005, three direct mail solicitations for Direct 
TV were received in a Los Angeles mailbox: all three retailers charged $29.99 a month for the 
first three months of a one-year subscription. 
6  Mr Orlando Soto of New York exemplifies a high-type consumer in the context of email 
marketing (“For Orlando Soto, No Day Is Complete Without Some Spam”, Wall Street Journal, 
March 15, 2004).  More generally, avoidance of mass advertising varies systematically with 
consumer demographics and the advertising medium (Speck and Elliott 1997).   6
and such that the function  ) ( 1 j k α −  has a decreasing hazard rate,
 7 8 i.e., 





















α .         ( 3 )  
The cost of concealment is  ) ( j K k C , where 











d .     (4) 
Further, given that the consumer has been addressed, she can invest 
effort to deflect solicitations, for instance, by using TiVo to skip advertisements, 
subscribing to a telephone call screening service, or using spam filters.
9  Let the 
(conditional) probability that she receives the solicitations be  ) ( j e ρ , where  j e  
represents the consumer’s effort in deflection and  
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ = > < =













,      (5) 
and such that the function  ) ( 1 j e ρ −  has a decreasing hazard rate, i.e., 




















ρ .         ( 6 )  
The cost of deflection is  ) ( j E e C , which function has the same properties as 
detailed in (4) for  ) ( j K k C .   
The consumers decide on concealment and deflection at the same time as 
sellers decide on solicitations.  In the next stage, consumers decide whether or 
not to buy.  Figure 1 describes the timing of actions.  If a high-type consumer 
receives solicitations from multiple sellers, she purchases from one of the sellers 
at random. 
                                            
7  Concealment is imperfect in the sense that the consumer cannot reduce the probability of 
being addressed below some minimum level, α .  Similarly, deflection is imperfect.  
Realistically, so long as one has a postal address, telephone number, or email address, 
receiving some amount of solicitations seems inevitable. 
8  In other words, the marginal decrease in probability of being addressed is non-increasing as 
the level of concealment increases. 
9  In mid-2004, Microsoft Hotmail’s SmartScreen was blocking almost 3 billion messages daily, 
which represented over 95 percent of all incoming spam (Gates 2004).   7
Figure 1 
 
Sellers set price 
Sellers send solicitations 
Consumers conceal and deflect 
Each high-type consumer draws 
randomly among solicitations 
received and buys one unit 
 
The price  ) , ( v v p λ ∈  is exogenous.  Following Butters (1977), Grossman 
and Shapiro (1984), and McAfee (1994), we model the solicitations as draws 
with replacement from an “effective pool” of consumers.  Each consumer’s 
presence in the effective pool is reduced by the extent of her effort in 
concealment.  Specifically, we assume that the effective pool is  L H ′ + ′ , where 
∑ ∑
= =






j k L k H
1 1
) ( ) ( α α   and     .        ( 7 )  
By (2), this specification has the reasonable properties that, if all  0 = j k , then, all 
1 ) ( = j k α , and so,  L H L H + = ′ + ′ , and further, if all  ∞ → j k , then, all  α α = ) ( j k , 
and hence,  α ] [ L H L H + = ′ + ′ , which is the minimum “presence” of consumers 
in the effective pool. 
 
  To ensure that the analysis is tractable, we assume that consumers and 
sellers behave symmetrically.
10  To ensure that the market is sufficiently 
profitable, so that the setting is not trivial, we assume that 





                                            
10  The focus on symmetric equilibria is common to much research in advertising and direct 
marketing (Grossman and Shapiro 1984; McGahan and Ghemawat 1994; Meurer and Stahl 
1994; Baye and Morgan 2001 and 2004; Iyer and Pazgal 2003).    8
4.   Market Equilibrium 
Consumer Concealment and Deflection 
Since sellers set  ) , ( v v p λ ∈ , a high-type consumer who receives a solicitation will 
buy the item, while a low-type who receives a solicitation will not.  Given that a 
seller has sent a solicitation, the probability that a particular consumer j receives 
the solicitation is 
  ) ( ) ( j j e k ρ α .           ( 9 )  
A high-type consumer’s expected net utility is her expected net benefit 
from consuming the item (net of the price), less the expected harm from 
solicitations, and less the costs of concealment and deflection.  Her probability 
of consuming the item is the probability of receiving at least one solicitation, 
which is equal to one minus the probability of receiving no solicitations, hence 
her expected net benefit from consumption is 























ρ α .       ( 1 0 )  
The consumer incurs harm, w, from every solicitation received.  Hence, 







j j ′ + ′
∑
) ( ) ( ρ α ,        ( 1 1 )  
where ∑
i
i S  is the total solicitations by all sellers. 
In symmetric equilibrium, all sellers send the same number of solicitations, 
S Si = , all  N i ,.., 1 = .  Substituting in (10) and (11), and noting that  ) ( j K k C  and 
) ( j E e C  represent the costs of concealment and deflection respectively, the high-
type consumer j’s expected net utility is
11  
[]
), ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) ( 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) , (
j E j K j j
j E j K
N
j j j j h
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11  We are grateful to a reviewer for observing that the high-type consumer benefits from the 
first solicitation received, and then suffers harm from every subsequent one.   9
where the conditional expected net benefit less harm (conditional on being 
addressed and receiving a solicitation), 























− − ≡ 1 1 .       ( 1 3 )  
  By (12), since concealment is costly, if the net benefit from the item is 
high enough, and the harm from solicitations is low enough that 
0 ≥ B ,            ( 1 4 )  
then the high-type consumer will choose zero concealment. 
However, if (14) is not satisfied, then she will choose the level of 
concealment that minimizes the sum of harm and concealment cost less expected 
net benefit, 
) ( ) ( ) ( j K j j k C B e k + − ρ α .         ( 1 5 )  
The first-order condition is 









ρ ,        ( 1 6 )  
where, for simplicity, we ignore the impact of concealment on  ) ( j k B  through 
H′.




) ( j K k C
) ( ) ( ) ( j K j j k C B e k + − ρ α




                                            
12 Intuitively, when the effective pool of consumers is large, each individual consumer’s 
concealment would have a minimal impact on her presence in the effective pool.   10
The high-type consumer’s choice of deflection is similar.  Under 
condition (14), she will choose zero deflection.  Otherwise, she will choose 
according to the first-order condition, 









α .        ( 1 7 )  
The analysis for low-type consumers is similar except that, since  p v < λ , 
they would not buy the item, hence a low-type consumer j’s expected net utility 
is simply 
). ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( j E j K j j j j l e C k C w
L H
NS
e k e k U − −
′ + ′
− = ρ α     (18) 
Evidently, the low-type consumer will choose positive levels of concealment and 
deflection, which are characterized by the first-order conditions  
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α       ( 2 0 )  
Proposition 1.  Consumers’ concealment and deflection are strategic 
complements (Bulow et al. 1985) with the sellers’ solicitations.
13 
Intuitively, if sellers increase solicitations, this means more harm for low-
type consumers, so they definitely will increase concealment and deflection.  The 
response of high-type consumers depends on their conditional expected net 
benefit less harm, B.  If  0 ≥ B , they do nothing, while if  0 < B , they, like low-
type consumers, will increase concealment and deflection.   
Finally, in symmetric equilibrium,  h j k k =  for all high-type consumers, and 
l j k k =  for all low-type consumers.  Hence, with regard to the effective pool, 
  ) ( h k H H α = ′  and  ) ( l k L L α = ′ .        ( 2 1 )  
Figure 3 shows the high- and low-type consumer concealment as a 
function of seller solicitations.  By Proposition 1, consumer concealment is 
increasing in seller solicitation.  Further, by comparing (16) and (19), it is 
                                            
13  For brevity, the proofs of this and all other results are provided in the Appendix.   11
obvious that, for all S , the concealment function of the low-type consumer 
always lies to the right of that of the high-type consumer (since the high-type 
consumer gets positive benefit from the item, she spends less in concealment).
14  
The consumers’ deflection strategy is similar. 
Figure 3 
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Refer to Figure 1, which depicts the steps involved in making a sale.  Suppose 
that sellers  m i ≠  choose  S Si = , while seller m chooses  m S .  Consider a high-
type consumer who has received a solicitation from seller m.  If she receives no 
other solicitation, she will buy from seller m with certainty.  However, if she 
receives solicitations from j other sellers, she will buy with probability  ] 1 /[ 1 + j  
from seller m, since all sellers charge the same price,  p .  Taking account of the 
number of ways in which the j sellers can be selected, then, conditional on the 
consumer having been addressed and received a solicitation, the probability that 































  To calculate seller m’s expected revenue, we must sum over all the various 
possibilities,  1 ,.., 0 − = N j , take account of the probability that the consumer is 
                                            
14  The shapes of the consumer concealment reaction functions depend on the functional 
form of  ) ( j K k C , but for our purposes, they are not important.  We introduce the blue curves 
later: they are seller solicitations as a function of low-type (high-type) consumer concealment, 
holding deflection and high-type (low-type) consumer concealment unchanged.   12
high-type and the consumer’s effort in concealment and deflection, and multiply 
by seller m’s number of solicitations and the price.  Accordingly, seller m’s 













































= . (22) 
The next result provides a useful simplification. 
 























































  Applying Lemma 1 to (22), seller m’s profit is 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 ) ( m m h h
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.    (24) 
Proposition 2.  Sellers’ solicitation is a strategic complement to concealment by 
low-type consumers, and a strategic substitute to concealment and deflection by 
high-type consumers. 
  Intuitively, if low-type consumers increase concealment, they reduce their 
presence and hence enrich the proportion of high types in the effective pool of 
consumers.  Hence, sellers would increase solicitations.  By contrast, if high-type 
consumers increase concealment and deflection, they dilute the effective pool of 
consumers.  Accordingly, sellers would reduce solicitations.   
  Referring to Figure 3, the upward-sloping blue curve depicts seller 
solicitation as a function of low-type consumer concealment, holding deflections 
and high-type consumer concealment constant, while the downward-sloping   13
blue curve depicts seller solicitation as a function of high-type consumer 






To ensure that the setting is not trivial, we must prove the existence of 
equilibrium, and in particular, that sellers will want to send solicitations.  We 
state this formally in Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2.  There exists a non-trivial equilibrium.  
Referring to (13), if  0 ≥ B , the equilibrium is defined by the sellers and 
low-type consumers, i.e., conditions (24), (19), and (20), while if  0 ≥ B , the 
equilibrium is defined by the sellers and both consumer types, i.e., conditions 
(24), (16), (17), (19), and (20). 
Generally, we cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria.  The 
reaction functions of the sellers and low-type consumers both slope upward, 
hence it is possible that they will intersect more than once.  To ensure that the 
equilibrium is unique, we need to specify the third derivatives of the 
concealment, deflection, and cost functions. 
                                            
15   The blue curves correspond to cross-sections of the seller solicitation reaction function 
(which is a surface) with respect to consumer concealment and deflection.  As with the 
consumer reaction functions, the shape of the seller solicitation function is not essential. 
16   In the Appendix, specifically, the proof of Lemma 1, we show that  0 / > h h dk de .  
Similarly, it can be shown that  0 / > h h dk de .  Hence, the diagram for consumer deflection is 
essentially the same as Figure 3.   14
5. Welfare and Empirical Implications 
Welfare is the expected benefit that the item provides to high-type consumers 
less the sellers’ solicitation cost, the harm caused by solicitations to both 
consumer types, and the costs of concealment and deflection to both consumer 
types.  From (23), the expected benefit from the item to high-type consumers is 
N  times the benefit conveyed by one seller, i.e., 
). ( )] ( [
) ( ) (
1 1
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Hence, welfare is 
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Comparing a typical seller’s profit and social welfare (equations (23) and 
(25)), there are two essential differences: 
•  Sellers ignore the harm caused by solicitations and consumers’ efforts in 
concealment and detection.  These externalities cause sellers’ 
solicitations to exceed the socially optimal level. 
•  Sellers charge less than v for the item, hence leaving high-type 
consumers with some surplus.  To this extent, sellers’ solicitations fall 
short of the socially optimal level.  This effect is a standard result of any 
analysis of imperfect competition. 
Our first welfare result follows immediately.  It addresses the policy 
question of how to induce sellers to internalize the externalities that they impose 
on consumers.   A “postage” charge or tax on email has been widely advocated 
as a way to resolve the problem of spam, most famously by Microsoft co-  15
founder, Bill Gates (CNN.com 2004).   How should the charge be set?  It might 
seem intuitive to set the charge equal to the expected harm caused by 
solicitations.  However, our analysis implies such a charge would be too low 
because it overlooks consumers’ concealment and deflection costs.  Comparing 
a typical seller’s profit and social welfare (equations (23) and (25)), the following 
charge would align seller’s profit with social welfare: 
Proposition 3.  The optimal charge per unit of seller solicitations is 
. ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
] )[ ( )] ( [
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  Intuitively, the charge is decreasing in the expected surplus of high-type 
consumers, and increasing with the expected harm caused by solicitations and 
consumers’ concealment and deflection costs. 
  Our next welfare result focuses on the relative social value of 
concealment and deflection.  Governments promote both concealment (“do not 
contact” lists) and deflection (educating consumers to use spam filters).  Which 
should they emphasize? 
Proposition 4.  If the number of sellers, N , is sufficiently large, deflection is 
socially preferable to concealment. 
Intuitively, deflection works by reducing the probability of receiving a 
solicitation that has been addressed to the consumer, and so, reduces the 
expected harm and, for a high-type consumer, also reduces the expected net 
benefit from consuming the item.   
By contrast, concealment has two effects.  One is to reduce the 
consumer’s probability of being addressed – an effect which is similar to that of 
deflection.  The other effect of concealment is quite subtle.  It shrinks the 
“effective pool” of consumers.  Superficially, this might seem to be   16
inconsequential, as it simply causes the same number of seller solicitations to be 
spread over fewer consumers.  However, it does matter, because for high-type 
consumers, one solicitation is valuable, while additional solicitations cause harm.  
The smaller the pool over which the solicitations are spread, the higher will be 
the probability that high-type consumers receive more than one solicitation.  
Accordingly, the other effect of concealment also reduces social welfare. 
  Proposition 4 implies that, in markets which are more competitive in the 
sense of having more sellers, policy-makers should pay more attention to 
deflection than concealment.  For instance, to the extent that entry barriers into 
email marketing are lower than barriers into other forms of direct marketing, 
there will be relatively more online retailers.  Accordingly, policy-makers should 




Given the seller-consumer equilibrium, we can compute the effects of changes 
in the demand, cost, and competition parameters.  Generally, parameter changes 
have direct effects through the sellers’ profit and the consumers’ expected net 
benefit, harm, and costs.  They also have indirect effects, as the direct effect on 
one party causes its reaction function to shift, thus moving the equilibrium.   
In order to ensure that the equilibrium is unique, and hence that the 
comparative statics are meaningful, we assume specific functional forms for 























ρ ρ ,       ( 2 6 )  
and 
 
2 ) ( m m cS S C = , 
2 ) ( j k j K k c k C = , and 
2 ) ( j e j E e c e C = ,      ( 2 7 )  
which we call the “reciprocal-quadratic” specification. 
                                            
17  Conjecture: One more proposition – Increase in competition (higher N) will lead to lower welfare.  
Direct effect: increase in expected benefit outweighed by increase in expected harm.  But what 
about effects through changes in S, k, e?   17
  With the “reciprocal-quadratic” specification, we computed the 
comparative statics as reported in the following Table in the case of  0 ≥ B , i.e., 
where the high-type consumers prefer to receive solicitations. 
Table 
Effect of an increase in 
On variable  v  H   L  K C   E C   w  C   N  
S   Nil  ?  - - +  + - ? 
l h k k ,   Nil  ?  - - +  + - ? 
l h e e ,   Nil  ?  - + - + - ? 
 
However, in the case of  0 < B , most of comparative statics had ambiguous sign 
as the direct and indirect effects were in opposite directions. 
In 2003, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission established a national “do 
not call” registry.  This would have reduced the cost of concealment from 
telemarketing.  According to the Table, sellers would respond by increasing 
solicitations, as the effective pool of consumers becomes richer in high-type 
consumers.   The Direct Marketing Association (2004), provides some 
supportive empirical evidence: “For those direct marketers whose primary 
objective was to solicit direct order sales, telephone marketing again produced 
the highest response rate (5.78%), … Telephone also led the pack in terms of 
overall efficiency for direct order marketers ... Perhaps this was due to the 
institution of Do-Not-Call laws, leaving a smaller, but more productive base to 
promote to” (page 29).  
By (13), the function B is decreasing in N , hence the smaller is N , the 
more likely is  0 ≥ B .  Refer to DMA report, for types of direct marketing that 
are relatively less used, then N  would be relatively lower, and hence,  0 ≥ B  is 
more likely.  Accordingly, to the extent that telemarketing involves fewer 
competitors than email marketing,  0 ≥ B  is more likely and hence the Table is 
more likely to apply.   18
6.  Concluding Remarks 
Consumers widely use VCRs, TiVo, caller-ID, spam filters, anonymous 
browsing, and many other devices – all to avoid marketing, and so, protect their 
privacy.  Our contribution is to introduce consideration of “marketing 
avoidance” into analytical research.  This fits into the broader context of market 
reactions to the 4Ps of marketing, with the three others being cannibalization of 
product offerings, conflict in distribution channels, competition in pricing. 
While we set the analysis in terms of direct marketing, it also applies to 
broadcast advertising with the following limitation.  Since broadcast advertising 
is not targeted, consumers can only avoid by deflection and not by concealment.  
Accordingly, all of our results with respect to deflection apply to broadcast 
advertising.  
We assumed that the price of the item was exogenous.  It is fairly 
straightforward to allow the upstream manufacturer or service provider to 
determine the price of the item.  Clearly, it would set the price at either  v λ  or v, 
depending on whether it is relatively more profitable to set a lower price and sell 
to both consumer types or set a high price and sell only to the high-type 
consumers.  The price would affect seller solicitation and consumer 
concealment and deflection in fairly obvious ways. 
  We assumed that solicitations caused the same harm w to both high- and 
low-type consumers.  Realistically, the harm caused by solicitations might differ 
between the segments.  For instance, people with higher income would have 
higher opportunity cost of time, and hence both benefit more from the item 
being marketed and suffer more from solicitations.  What we need for the key 
results is that for the high segment, the benefit net of harm exceeds that for the 
low segment.  Formally, suppose that low-type consumers suffer harm w μ , 
where  1 < μ , then what we need is that  w p v w p v μ λ − − > − − .
18   
  We assumed a general function for the sellers’ cost of solicitations. 
Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), and McAfee (1994) suggest the 
                                            
18  To confirm.   19













m 1 ln ) ( , 
where c is the unit cost of each draw from the effective pool of consumers.  As 
explained by McAfee, this formulation exhibits constant returns to scale in the 
sense that if a given quantity of solicitations is divided into two batches, the total 
cost of solicitation would remain the same.  Taking this as a benchmark, we 
could explore the implications of increasing and decreasing returns to scale in 
solicitation.  20
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider a high-type consumer.  If (14) holds, she 
chooses zero concealment, hence an increase in sellers’ solicitations does not 

























1 1 ,       ( A 1 )  
and her choice of concealment is given by (16).   
Before considering (16), some preliminary analysis is useful.   
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since the last expression is just the first term in the summation on the left-hand 
side of the inequality.  Substituting from (A3) in (A2), we have 


























dB .       (A4) 
Next, we claim that  0 / ≥ j j dk de .  Totally differentiating (16) and (17),  
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which simplifies to 
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   (A8) 
Since (14) does not hold,  0 < B .  By (2) and (4),  0 / < j dk dα ,  0 / < j de dρ , 
0 /
2 2 > j K dk C d , and  0 /
2 2 > j E de C d .  Further, by (3) and (6), 
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By (A9) and the same observations as following (A8), the coefficient of  j k Δ  on 











j ,          ( A 1 0 )  
which is the result. 
  The proof for deflection is similar, as is the proof for the low-type 
consumers. [ ] 
 

























)! 1 ( )! 1 (
! 1
)! 1 ( )! 1 (
)! 1 (








N j N j
N




















































































j j N N
j
j j N N
j
























   (A11) 
Now 
    ,    1 1
    1 1








N j j N N
j
j j N N
j




























































































   (A12) 










and the third step applies the binomial theorem.  Substituting from (A12) in 
(A11) yields the result. [ ] 
   25
Proof of Proposition 2:  Consider the left-hand side of (24).  Clearly, it is 
increasing in  l k  and decreasing in  h e , which proves that the seller’s solicitation is 
a strategic complement with the low-type consumer’s concealment, and a 
strategic substitute with the high-type consumer’s deflection. 
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Δ =           ( A 1 3 )  
Suppose  0 = ΔS ,  0 = Δ l k ,  0 = Δ h e , and let 
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Then (A13) simplifies to 
, ) ( ) (
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     (A16) 
since the last expression is just the first term in the summation on the left-hand 
side of the inequality.  Substituting (A16) into (A14),  0 > Φ .  Now, by (2), 
0 / < h dk dα , hence the coefficient of  h k Δ  on the right-hand side of (A15) is 
negative.  By (1),  0 /
2 2 > m dS C d  and hence, by (A15),  0 / < Δ Δ h m k S , which implies 
that the seller’s solicitation is a strategic substitute with the high-type consumer’s 
concealment. [ ] 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Differentiating (13) with respect to S ,  




















1 .      ( A 1 7 )  
Differentiating again,  

























At  0 = S ,  0 = B  and  0 / > dS dB , since  w p v > − .  By (A17), for sufficiently large 
S ,  0 / < dS dB .  Note that B depends on  h k  and  l k  through H′ and L′. 
Accordingly, there exists  0 ) , ( ~ > l h k k S  defined by  
  0 )) , ( ~ ( = l h k k S B ,          ( A 1 8 )  
and such that, for  )) , (
~
, 0 ( l h k k S S ∈ , then  0 ) ( > S B .  
Figure 4   27
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Refer to Figure 4.  Suppose that the high-type consumers choose zero 
concealment and deflection,  0 = = h h e k .  We first show that the seller solicitation 
function,  ) , | ( h h l e k k S , with  0 = = h h e k , intersects the S -axis at a level  0 0 > S .  By 
(2) and (5),  0 ) ( > ≥α α h k  and  0 ) ( > ≥ ρ ρ h e .  So, the left-hand side of (24) is 
positive.  Now, by (1),  0 / = m dS dC  at  0 = m S .  Hence, by (24),  0 > m S  when 
0 = l k , i.e.,  0 0 > S . 
Next, by Proposition 2, the solicitation function is decreasing in  h k , while 
by (2), if  ∞ → h k , then  0 / → h dk dα , and so, the right-hand side of (A15) 
converges to zero, which implies that  0 / → Δ Δ h m k S , i.e., that seller solicitations 
tend towards an asymptote as  ∞ → h k .   
Further, by Proposition 1, the low-type consumers’ concealment function 
) | ( l l e S k  is increasing, while by (19),  0 = l k  if  0 = S  and  ∞ → l k  as  ∞ → S .  
Accordingly, the seller solicitation and low-type consumer concealment 
functions will intersect at some  ) , (
* *
l k S , where  0
* > S  and  0
* > l k .  
If  ) , 0 (
~ * *
l h k k S S = ≤ , then, by (A18), the high-type consumers would 
choose zero concealment and deflection, which is consistent with the initial 
supposition.  Accordingly,  ) , , , , (
* * *
l l h h e k e k S , with  0 = = h h e k  and where 
*
l e  solves 
(20), constitutes the seller-consumer equilibrium. 
However, if  ) , 0 (
~ * *
l h k k S S = > , the high-type consumers would choose 
positive levels of concealment and deflection,  0 > h k  and  0 > h e , which is not 
consistent with the original supposition.  Then, let  k kh Δ =  and  e eh Δ = , and now 
re-compute the seller solicitation function,  ) , | ( h h l e k k S , illustrated by the broken   28
curve in Figure 4.  By Proposition 2, the increase in  h k  and  h e  would shift the 
sellers’ solicitation function downwards, and so, shift its intersection with the 
low-type consumer concealment function to some  ) , (
* * * k k S S l Δ − Δ − .   
Referring to the high-type consumer concealment and deflection, if  
k e S S k h h Δ = Δ − ) | (
* *  and  e e S S e h h Δ = Δ − ) | (
* * ,        (A19) 
then  ) , , , , (
* * * * * e e k k e k S S l l Δ − Δ − Δ Δ Δ − , where 
* * e el Δ −  solves (20), constitutes the 
seller-consumer equilibrium.  However, if  k e S S k h h Δ > Δ − ) | (
* *  or 
e e S S e h h Δ > Δ − ) | (
* * , then continue to raise  h k  and  h e  by small increments and 
repeat the above procedure until the intersection of the seller solicitation and 
low-type concealment curves satisfies the equivalent of condition (A19).  Figure 
3 illustrates the equilibrium. [ ] 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  The direct effect of high-type consumer concealment 
on welfare (ignoring consequential effects on consumer deflection and seller 
solicitation) 
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Similarly, the direct effect of high-type consumer deflection on welfare, 
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Suppose that  h h E K e k C C = = = (.), (.) (.), (.) ρ α , then, subtracting (A23) from (A20),   29
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which proves the result for high-type consumers.  
  Likewise, the direct effect of the low-type consumers’ concealment  
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 (A24) 
and direct effect of low-type consumer deflection on welfare, 
. ) (




















     ( A 2 5 )  
Suppose that  l h E K e e C C = = = (.), (.) (.), (.) ρ α , then, subtracting (A25) from (A24), 
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Since  0 / < l dk dα , the sign of (A26) is that of  
w e k L e k H e k Hv
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By (2),  0 ) ( 1 > ≥ ≥ α α j k , hence, for sufficiently large  N , 
0 ) (
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< ,           ( A 2 8 )  
since  0 / < l dk dα .  This proves the result for low-type consumers. [ ] 